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Abstract 
One of the main tasks of the long-term expansion of the Lithuanian railway transport is to ensure, following the European Union 
legislation, the implementation of a reform of the Lithuanian railway transportation sector so that the competitiveness of the 
country’s railways in the European transport services market is increased. To properly implement the aforementioned objective, 
it is crucial to understand and to carry out a careful analysis on the existing railway management models (the separated one, the 
integrated one following the principle of holding and a completely integrated one). Only once all the pros and cons of the railway 
management models have been analyzed, one can choose the most optimum option for Lithuanian railways. This article will look 
at the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated model on the basis of the German railways. The article analyses the review 
of the German railway management model, the structure of the railway system, the criticism of the Deutsche Bahn model is 
provided in it along with the advantages of the German model. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of 20th century purposeful efforts have been put in the European Union single market with a view 
to creating conditions for competition in the railway market, to separating the management of infrastructure and 
transportation services. A number of legislative acts have been adopted on the European Union level foreseeing a 
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structural reorganization of railways seeking to create competition in this area, to increase effectiveness, to return 
the passengers and freights from the competing modes of transport and reduce the burden on national budgets. In its 
Impact Assessment of the Fourth Railway Package, the European Commission has presented its views on the 
reasons that have determined the necessity to reform the railway transportation sector since railway infrastructure is 
a natural monopoly. The creation of it is very expensive, therefore, from the economic point of view, it cannot be 
justified that each railway company should build its own railway tracks. Therefore, special rules are necessary to 
ensure an optimum management of the common infrastructure and the use of it by different railway companies. 
The 2011 White Paper of the European Commission on European Transport Policy (Roadmap to a Single 
European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system) indicates that once more 
favourable conditions for competition among railway companies are created, this will ensure that the entire railway 
sector will become more competitive with regard to other modes of transport. 
One of the operating railway management models, which is both criticized and seen as positive in the area of 
increasing competitiveness, is a holding. Currently, of all the European countries, Germany has been most 
successful in implementing this model. 
2. The Models of Railway Infrastructure Management and Railway Transport Service Provision 
Taking into consideration the existing experience of the European Union countries, two main railway 
infrastructure management and railway transport service provision models can be singled out, i.e. the separated 
model and the integrated model (Gómez-Ibáñez 2006): 
1. The Separated Model. The essence of this model is a complete separation of infrastructure and transportation 
services, i.e. institutional and factual separation of infrastructure and transportation services into separate legal 
persons that are not interrelated (Sweden, Great Britain). 
As a separate option of this model should be mentioned the structure when railway transportation activity is 
completely separated from railway infrastructure management, but the infrastructure is managed and administered 
not by one company but by several independent companies, which ensure e.g. infrastructure planning, infrastructure 
maintenance, infrastructure capacity distribution and collection of charges (Holland). 
2. The Integrated Model. This model may be implemented on the basis of a vertically integrated model, i.e.  
a holding structure, when railway infrastructure is managed by a separate legal person holding its own 
accounts, budget and independent financial results, but which together with the companies providing 
communication services belongs to one group of companies (Germany, Italy, Austria). One should note that 
although companies belong to the same group of companies, infrastructure manager does not have a right to 
provide advantage to the companies of the group over other companies providing railway transportation 
services (operating outside the holding boundaries (Europos susisiekimo ministrų konferencija 2005). 
The option of an absolute integrated model is a single, completely integrated company operating in the railway 
transportation sector. In this case, the accounts of the railway infrastructure and railway transport activities are 
separated, it is established that independent institutions determine infrastructure charges and distribute infrastructure 
capacities, however, railway infrastructure management and provision of railway transport services remain business 
segments of a single company (Lithuania). 
As it was mentioned, the theme of this article is to discuss the experience of Germany. Hence, the principles of 
functioning of other models will not be analyzed. 
3. A Review of the German Railway Management Model 
The reform of the railway transport sector in Germany started in 1994, once two state enterprises Deutsche 
Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn were merged, and on the basis on this merger a private legal person was 
established, public company Deutsche Bahn AG, 100 per cent of whose shares belong to the German state. In 1999 
the primary structure of the concern was established: separate activities of Deutsche Bahn AG were divided into 
separate public companies, the sole shareholder of which became Deutsche Bahn AG (Die Privatisierun 2006). For 
the management of railway network infrastructure and train stations separate public companies were established: DB 
Netz AG and DB Station&Service AG. The functions, legal status, management and accounting of these companies 
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were separated from the railway communication companies belonging to Deutsche Bahn AG, such as Railon 
Deutschland AG (freight transportation), DB Regio AG (passenger transportation on short distances) and DB 
Fernverkehr AG (passenger transportation on long distances) (IBM Global… 2007). 
In 2008 the third stage of the German railway reform was foreseen, i.e. partial privatization of Deutsche Bahn 
AG. To this end, the structure of the group was changed but due to the decline in prices during the financial crisis the 
circulation of the shares of Deutsche Bahn AG in the stock market was suspended unlimitedly. Currently, there are 
opinions that privatization shall be carried out not earlier than in the second decade. As the German government was 
selecting the most optimum option of privatization, they took into consideration the opinions of experts of various 
fields. To put it into a system, one can single out the following main models suggested: (i) privatization of the entire 
railway (both infrastructure and railway communication and services sectors) – in this case, pursuant to the legal 
regulation of the German concerns, only partial privatization (maximum 49 per cent of all shares) would be possible; 
(ii) only privatization of railway communication and service sector (railway infrastructure is exclusively owned by 
the state), and (iii) partial privatization of these sectors. 
After long political debates partial model of privatization of Deutsche Bahn AG was selected. According to this 
model, management of railway infrastructure remains the object of the activities of the subsidiaries of Deutsche 
Bahn AG, whose sole shareholder is the German state. The companies providing railway communication services, 
logistics companies and companies providing related services were transferred to the newly established public 
company, DB Mobility Logistics AG, whose sole shareholder is Deutsche Bahn AG. The currently effective 
legislation stipulates that part of the shares of DB Mobility Logistics AG should be circulated to private investors 
under the condition that the main shareholder remains Deutsche Bahn AG. Part of the subsidiaries of DB Mobility 
Logistics AG, providing services (cleaning, information technologies, telecommunications, etc.), up to 100 per cent 
of the shares may be transferred to private investors. According to the selected model, Deutsche Bahn AG, DB 
Mobility Logistics AG and their subsidiaries form a concern. 
In this way, Germany has implemented the requirement of the European Union legislation to separate railway 
transportation services from railway infrastructure management by ensuring a separate property, budget and 
accounts of the companies providing these services (Die Privatisierung 2006). Beside this, in accordance with 
Directive 2001/14 in case railway infrastructure manager is dependent on one of the railway companies (providing 
goods and (or) passenger transportation) with regard to its legal form, organizational structure or decision making 
functions, establishing railway infrastructure charges and distributing of railway infrastructure capacities can only be 
completed by a charges setting authority independent by its legal form, organization and decision making from any 
railway company. It is precisely due to this reason that the model of a concern is criticized as one unable to ensure 
the independence required by the European Union legislation by stating that even separate legal persons find it 
difficult to ensure a factual independence of infrastructure manager from other companies of the concern, including 
those providing railway transportation services (KCW,  2006). The advocates of concerns, in their turn, claim that 
the structure enshrined by laws is feasible, whereas the companies of the concern operate as persons that are not 
interrelated. 
4. The Structure of the Railway System 
The privatization model of Deutsche Bahn AG was enshrined by the Participation Agreement (“Beitei-
ligungsvertrag”), which was concluded by the German Federal Republic Deutsche Bahn AG and DB Mobility 
Logistics AG. The Participation Agreement enshrined the structure of the Deutsche Bahn concern, the transfer of 
passenger and freight transportation and related service providing companies from Deutsche Bahn AG to DB 
Mobility Logistics AG, it was foreseen how much and what kind of company shares have to be and could be 
privatized. 
The structure of the Deutsche Bahn concern that was enshrined by the Participation Agreement consists of two 
main companies and their subsidiaries: 
1. Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG). DB AG is a public company, 100 per cent of whose shares belong to the 
German state. DB AG together with its subsidiaries make a concern. 
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The activity of DB AG consists of nine major business sectors. After the restructurization of 2008, DB AG is a 
direct and sole holder of the shares of three subsidiaries, governing the railway network and infrastructure. Other 
business sectors were transferred to a newly established subsidiary DB Mobility Logistics AG, whose shares 
currently belong to DB AG, but in the future a partial or complete privatization of the company and some of its 
subsidiaries has been foreseen. 
Railway infrastructure is governed and the related infrastructure services are provided by the following 
subsidiaries of DB AG, whose sole shareholder is DB AG and whose privatization according to the currently existing 
legislation is not feasible: 
1. DB Netz AG is a subsidiary of DB AG, governing and administering the German railway network and 
infrastructure (business segment of “DB Netze Fahrweg”). The main task of the company is to ensure a basis 
for a safe and trustworthy railway infrastructure exploitation, i.e. that of long distance trip railway network, 
short distance railway network, connection of railway tracks and repair equipment (DB Netze Fahrweg). The 
company activities also include the repair and safety of railway network, drafting train schedules, development 
of infrastructure and supply of the routes in line with the clients’ interests (DB Netze Fahrweg). DB Netz AG 
ensures equal non discriminatory access to the infrastructure for all the companies providing railway 
communication services.  
2. DB Station & Service AG is a subsidiary of DB AG, which is responsible for the maintenance and 
exploitation of the German passenger railway stations and provision of the related services (“DB Netze 
Personenbahnhöfe” business segment) (DB Netze Personenbahnhöfe...). 
3. DB Energie GmbH is a subsidiary company of DB AG, ensuring the provision of electric power and fuel 
(diesel) for mobile and stationary users (business segment of “DB Netz Energie”) (DB Energie…).  
4. DB Projektbau GmbH, DB Bahnbau GmbH, etc. are subsidiaries of DB AG company providing additional 
services in relation to railway infrastructure maintenance, exploitation and development. DB Projektbau 
GmbH is responsible for project management, planning and maintenance of infrastructure object construction 
(Deutsche Bahn AG). DB Bahnbau GmbH activity comprises the installation of railway infrastructure (e. g. 
tunnel enlightenment, signalization systems) and processing of construction materials. 
The duty of all the subsidiaries of DB AG is to ensure non discriminatory conditions for all the companies to use 
railway infrastructure and to establish objective calculation methods of charges and use of infrastructure.  
To ensure the quality of infrastructure and the attractiveness of railway stations for passengers, in January 2009 
the German Government and DB AG signed an Agreement on Services and Financing (Leistungs- und 
Finanzierungsvereinbarung), by which the German state is obliged to pay DB AG an amount of 2.5 billion EUR per 
year. 88 per cent of the amount is paid to DB Netz AG, 10 per cent to DB Station & Service AG, and 2 per cent to DB 
Energie GmbH. DB AG in its turn is obliged to ensure the quality standard of railway network and railway stations. 
Beside this, it is obliged to invest 500 million EUR from its own funds per year, and to allocate additional 1 to 1.25 
billion EUR for maintenance and exploitation (Hennigfeld 2009). The critics treat such payments as indirect support 
for the railway transportation companies belonging to the concern, in this way providing them with a significant 
advantage over other private companies providing railway transportation services. On the other hand, the companies 
governing railway infrastructure shall ensure level playing field for all the companies providing railway 
communication services. 
2. DB Mobility logistics AG (DB ML AG) DB ML AG is the second major company of Deutsche Bahn concern, 
100 per cent of whose shares currently depend to DB AG. Although DB AG is the sole shareholder of DB ML 
AG, both of these companies take part in the management of this concern. The boards of both of these 
companies closely collaborate (Deutsche Bahn AG). The Participation Agreement enshrines that 24.9 per cent 
of the shares of DB ML AG shall be transferred to private investors. Beside this, an opportunity was created to 
transfer up to 100 per cent of shares of some of the subsidiaries of DB ML AG to private investors. In October 
2008 it was reported that the dissemination of the shares of DB ML AG in the stock exchange due to the 
decreased profitability possibly due to the financial crisis is postponed for an unlimited period (Netzwerk 
Privatbahnen….2009). Currently, the sole shareholder of DB ML AG is DB AG, the subsidiaries of the concern 
have not been privatized either. 
Subsidiary companies of DB AG of communication, logistics and other related services were transferred by the 
Participation Agreement to DB ML AG, aiming at separating these areas from railway infrastructure management 
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and preparing a legal and organizational structure for future privatization. DB ML AG has the following subsidiaries 
comprising six major business segments: 
1. DB Fernverkehr AG, the company providing long distance passenger transportation on railways services, 
and companies DB Autozug GmbH and CityNightLine CNL AG, whose activities comprise transportation of 
cars by railways and night train routes („DB Bahn Fernverkehr“ business segment). 100 per cent of the 
company shares belong to DB ML AG. The Participation Agreement foresees that 100 per cent of the shares 
of DB Fernverkehr AG remain the property of DB ML AG. 
2. DB Regio AG, the company providing the services of short distance (regional) passenger transportation on 
railways services, whose 100 per cent of shares belong to DB ML AG, and its subsidiary providing 
communication services by railways and buses in separate regions (e.g. DB Regio NRW GmbH, DB 
RegioNetz Verkehrs GmbH, etc.) (“DB Bahn Regio” business segment). The Participation Agreement 
stipulates that 100 per cent of the shares of DB Regio AG remain the property of DB ML AG. 
3. Railon Deutschland AG and other subsidiaries providing freight transportation on railways services (“DB 
Schenker Rail” business segment). 100 per cent of the shares of Railon Deutschland AG belong to DB ML 
AG. The Participation Agreement stipulates that 100 per cent of the shares of DB Regio AG remain the 
property of DB ML AG. 
4. Schenker AG, the company providing logistics services (“DB Schenker Logistics” business segment), whose 
100 per cent of shares belong to DB ML AG. The Participation Agreement stipulates that 100 per cent of the 
shares of Schenker AG remain the property of DB ML AG. 
5. DB Stadtverkehr Gmbh and its subsidiaries provide passenger transportation services within cities (subway, 
local trains (S-Bahn), trams and (or) buses) (“DB Bahn Stadtverkehr” business segment). 100 per cent of the 
shares of the company currently belong to DB ML AG, however, in accordance with the Participation 
Agreement the companies may be privatized. 
6. The business segment of service provision (“DB Dienstleistungen”), comprising the companies providing 
services related to passenger and freight transportation on railways (cleaning and equipment management, 
rolling stock maintenance, railway fleet management, ensuring safety, services of information technologies 
and telecommunications). The shares of these companies currently belong to DB ML AG, however, in 
accordance with the Participation Agreement the companies may be privatized. 
The privatization of DB ML AG and some of its subsidiaries is not to be treated as a prerequisite for proper 
implementation of the European Union legislation, but as a means to attract additional investment and in this way to 
reduce the costs allocated by the state for railway maintenance and to ensure greater competitiveness of the of the 
companies of the concern providing railway communication services. The arrival of private investors basically will 
not influence the management of the concern, since after a partial privatization of the company, DB AG, the holding 
company of Deutsche Bahn concern, will remain major shareholder of DB ML AG. The Participation Agreement 
established concrete areas that will be co-coordinated by the holding company after the privatization (the principles 
of balance, company development strategy, etc.). On the other hand, by implementing the requirements set out in the 
General Law on Railways, DB ML AG is ensured the independence of the accounting and decision making and 
independence from the companies managing railway infrastructure. All commercial transactions between the 
companies of the concern shall be made under the regular market conditions, as well as between the independent 
third persons (Vertrag über die Beteiligung… 2008). 
5. The Critics of the Deutsche Bahn Model 
The restructurization of Deutsche Bahn and its future privatization still cause debates both among politicians and 
non-governmental organizations. The critics of the German railway reform claims that 15 years after opening of the 
market, the competition in all three railway market segments (short distance (regional) routes, long distance routes 
and transportation of freights) appeared only partially. The companies of Deutsche Bahn concern have a dominating 
position in all of the market segments (Netzwerk Privatbahnen… 2009).  
On the other hand, in the study of IBM Global Business Services Germany is indicated as a country that was 
among countries that managed to early and very well implement the requirement of the European Union legislation 
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that foresees railway liberalization (IBM Global… 2007). According to the data of the German State Agency for 
Power, Gas, Telecommunications, Postal Services and Railway Networks in 2009 over 380 railway communication 
companies providing passenger or freight transportation services were registered in Germany (Bundesnetzagentur 
für Elektrizität 2009). Germany ensures open access to international and local freight transportation on railways 
market for the railway communication companies having permits to operate in the European Union Member States. 
For passenger transportation on short distance routes federal lands publish public procurement or call for tender. 
Beside this, alongside the trips for which public procurement or calls for tender are published, to also suggest 
independent routes allowing the company itself to undertake the economic risk (IBM Global 2007).  
One of the most criticized aspects of the model implemented in Germany is the structure of the concern chosen. It 
is stated that although theoretically it is feasible that the subsidiaries of DB AG governing railway infrastructure 
could act independently from the companies of the concern providing communication services, and the Chinese 
Wall built within the concern would not have holes, such a presumption could be hardly implemented in reality. 
Beside this, according to the provisions of the German Law on Shares regulating the legal status of the concern, DB 
AG board must act exceptionally in favour of the company, i.e. the entire concern, and its interests (Netzwerk 
Privatbahnen 2009). Even with the separate legal persons with an independent internal organizational structure, 
budget and accounts, the companies belonging to the concern are not completely independent due to their holding 
company implementing control and maintenance rights and duties with regard to their subsidiaries (KCW 2006). 
On the other hand, the third (private) railway communication companies point out the main obstacles for entering 
the market insufficiency of resources in the freight transportation market, e.g. wagon halting tracks for the trains 
carrying freights are often occupied and this disturbs the unceasing activity. Limited market of used rolling stock 
(trains) is indicated as another barrier precluding companies to enter and compete in the railway communication 
markets (IBM Global Business Services 2007).  
In June 2008 the European Commission sent out official notices to 24 Member States, including Germany, on the 
uncertain proper implementation of legislation, commonly referred to as First railway package. The main 
deficiencies indicated to Member States are insufficient separation of infrastructure manager from railway 
companies, improperly implemented provisions on the access to infrastructure charging, etc. 
In the conclusion of October 2008 the German government rejected these reproaches by stating that railway 
infrastructure manager is separated from the railway communication companies both by the provisions enshrined in 
the articles of the companies governing legal, organizational (contractual) and infrastructure companies and concern 
managing companies (DB AG ir DB ML AG). The independence criteria indicated by the European Commission 
very much exceed the factual legal requirements of the European Union and once they are adjusted, the structure of 
the concern that is allowed by the legislation could not be implemented. An analogue conclusion is made by one 
more experts of the European Union legislation, former Director General of the Commission, Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann (DB Mobility Networks Logisticsm 2009). The study Railway Liberalization Index 2007, supports 
statement that even though company DB Netz AG that looks after railway tracks is not completely vertically 
separated from railway communication companies Railon Deutschland AG, DB Regio AG and DB Fernverkehr AG 
the requirements of legislation with regard to infrastructure management and separation of transport activities have 
been implemented (IBM Global Business Services 2007). 
On 28 February 2013 the Court of Justice made a decision in Case C-556/10 Commission vs Germany. In this 
case the Court of Justice provided its clarification with regard to the implementation of the essential function 
independence requirements in the integrated railway companies of the holding model. The Court of Justice has first 
of all noted that the European Union law requires to separately handle only the accounting of the railway 
transportation services and railway infrastructure management of railway companies, and the separation of the 
railway transportation services provided by railway companies from railway infrastructure management may only be 
implemented by establishing separate divisions in the same company, as in the case of holding.  
To enable DB Netz to fulfil charge collection and capacity distribution functions, it has to be independent from 
DB AG in terms of its legal form, organization and decision making. Due to this issue it is unarguable that DB Netz 
has to first of all a separate from DB AG legal subjectivity and, secondly, separate from DB AG management bodies 
and their own resources. The Court of Justice has also emphasized that pursuant to the agreement of 1 June 1999 
that was concluded by DB AG and DB Netz on overtaking the control and transferring the profit according to 
Article 1 and Article 4 of the internal regulation of DB Netz, one should make a conclusion that under certain 
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provisions of private legislation one aims at precisely ensuring the independence of the decisions made by DB Netz 
from those of DB AG. Taking into consideration the aforementioned circumstances, the Court of Justice has rejected 
the claim of the European Commission on ensuring the independence of essential functions.  
By this decision not only was confirmed the legitimacy of holding models, but it was established that the 
interpretations of the European Commission not substantiated by legal norms are not binding upon Member States. 
6. The Advantages of the German Model 
The Synergy of the System. A holding is characteristic of a synergy of a system (i.e. an increase of activity 
effectiveness due to the integration of separate parts into a unified system). E.g. resources are used effectively in a 
holding structure, including investment funds, human resources (managing, industrial or other personnel); a single 
financial, investment, credit policy is executed (Шиткина 2006). Once the technical, technological, managerial, 
organizational, investment experience, the results of scientific research and experimental development is 
concentrated in one business subject (holding), the price of mainly any investment project is reduced (Шиткина 
2006). 
The Economy of Costs. Cost economy is closely related to the system synergy. The main company of a holding 
plans, organizes financial flows, centralized accounting, legal services, personnel policy, provides with information, 
statistics, marketing, etc. in favour of all the participants of a holding. This way one can avoid duplication of 
functions. High profile specialists of the aforementioned areas, working in the main company of the holding, fulfil 
their functions not with respect of one, but several or all companies of a holding, therefore, their potential is used at 
the maximum, and a high salary is justified (Шиткина 2006). 
In this case, common costs for wages are lower than when wages are paid, even smaller one, for several persons 
in different companies. In discussing a concrete example of the German railway company DB AG, which is the main 
holding company, activity three main areas are singled out: first of all, coordination of the activities of subsidiaries 
(including mediation in resolving conflicts between subsidiary companies); secondly, centralized public 
procurement; thirdly, prevention of the duplication of the functions of the board. Beside this, subsidiary companies 
of a holding share common centralized information technology systems (Merkert 2008). 
A holding structure is characteristic of the coordination between the companies than that one which appears on 
the basis of several contracts (which are essential once a model of complete separation is implemented), and this 
ensures a long term development of a single railway system and creates opportunities to reduce the costs (Calthrop 
2005). 
In the meantime, the loss of economies of scale is indicated as of the main deficiencies of the model of complete 
separation (Europos susisiekimo ministrų konferencija (ECMT) 2001). 
Maximum Implementation of the Limited Liability Principle of Companies. A holding structure provides an 
opportunity to implement a risk limitation strategy within the structure of a holding of a subsidiary company, by 
remaining independent legal persons, they execute activities in their name and simultaneously are liable with their 
property for their duties (Шиткина 2006). Other advantages of a holding: 
• Ensuring a high coordination level between infrastructure servicing and using infrastructure (a suitable 
interoperability between the transportation operators and infrastructure operators (Public institution 2006), 
convenient conditions to align separate parts of the railway system – i.e. the infrastructure, the rolling stock, 
the fleet, the logistics operations, etc. – the means of development (Vilniaus 2008); the prerequisites for an 
effective coordination of decision making, regulation of difficulties, ensuring traffic safety. 
• There is no interest conflict between infrastructure manager and the railway company (Viešoji įstaiga 2006) – 
the infrastructure manager is interested in the maintenance of infrastructure and development, therefore, they 
invest into it more purposefully (Europos susisiekimo ministrų konferencija (ECMT) 2005). 
7. Conclusions 
1. In the European Union it is aimed to ensure the competition of the railway sector by separating infrastructure 
management from transportation services. 
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2. Germany has chosen the model of a vertically integrated (holding) structure, when the railway 
infrastructure is managed and transportation services provided by the companies belonging to a single 
group of companies. 
3. Germany, by maintaining an integrated railway management, is a country that was one of the first and best 
implemented railway liberalization and non-discriminatory access to new carriers. This can be confirmed by 
the number of railway companies providing passenger and freight transportation services registered. 
4. The Court of Justice in Case C-556/10 European Commission vs Germany approved the legitimacy of holding 
models and the right of Member States to choose the most appropriate means of implementation of the 
European Union law. 
5. The holding structure has a strong coordination of carriers and infrastructure managers and ensures a long 
term development of a single railway system. 
6. The German holding structure allowed to reach a system synergy (effective use of resources, a single 
management policy, etc.), the costs economy and to avoid the duplication of functions. 
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